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Introduction 
Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? 
These weapons had profound implications in shaping the political and military landscape of Europe in the 
second half of the twentieth century—deterring Soviet aggression, reassuring NATO Allies of American 
commitment and protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and fostering stability in the midst of a 
hostile East-West relationship—yet their relative importance today is much less clear. 
 
The contemporary debate centers on whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is a useful, 
irrelevant or counterproductive strategy for maintaining security in Europe in today's security environment. 
Useful, in this context, refers to political and military utility for deterring aggression against Europe, 
maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments, dissuading other states from pursuing nuclear weapons, and 
defeating potential aggressors should conflict arise. This debate is extremely significant in today's 
environment where proliferation and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction reign as the 
greatest security threat. The issues surrounding the debate are broad and complex, and they warrant 
serious analysis if NATO is to move beyond the Cold War security framework. U.S. policymakers adhere 
to the political and military utility arguments, especially in the wake of September 11 and the new 
emphasis on countering the proliferation and use of WMD. Others argue that TNWs in Europe are 
irrelevant, meaning that their political and military utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and 
economic interdependence, the ever-increasing capabilities of conventional forces, and the existential 
deterrent provided by U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue 
that TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede progress in the NATO-Russia security relationship.  
 
This essay approaches the issue of forward basing TNWs in Europe from a pragmatic point of view, 
seeking to enhance European security while reducing the risk of nuclear conflict through cooperation. The 
essay views international security in the neo-liberalist tradition, accepting as a starting position the 
fundamental paradigm set forth by neo-realism, that the international system is governed by anarchy, 
where states are the primary actors, and these states are motivated by power and state interests. While 
cooperation in national security affairs is inherently difficult, it is also increasingly important in a security 
environment marked by global threats and WMD. From this approach, the essay analyzes the arguments 
concerning political and military utility, relevance, and counter productivity of U.S. theater nuclear 
weapons in Europe. It then offers two policy options: (1) maintaining the status quo, and (2) withdrawing 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe. The political-military implications of each are evaluated. In 
the final analysis, the essay recommends withdrawing theater nuclear weapons from Europe in favor of a 
strategy emphasizing conventional deterrence supported by reassurance and the general deterrent of 
strategic nuclear weapons in the background. 
Historical Background 
Arguments supporting the political and military utility of U.S. TNWs in Europe emerge from the rationale 
behind forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe during the Cold War. Given the perceived conventional 
imbalance after the Second World War, NATO relied on TNWs to provide a military solution to the 
problem of deterring Soviet aggression and defending Western Europe. The massive retaliation strategy 
became untenable with the emergence of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
This development spurred an evolution in NATO strategy focused on extending deterrence to Europe.  
 
Extended deterrence required a condition of coupling between U.S. and European security interests 
which could only be achieved through a credible U.S. nuclear response and a demonstrated U.S. 
commitment to Europe. Forward basing TNWs in Europe satisfied these requirements and solidified the 
transatlantic link. The ambiguity over when and how they would be used under flexible response masked 
the strategic debate over the various extended deterrence strategies in order to ensure Alliance cohesion. 
Above all, the utility of these weapons, and thus the strategy of basing them in Europe, stemmed from the 
overarching belief that the Cold War existed within the context of an immediate deterrence relationship. 
The nature of this deterrence relationship changed significantly with the end of the Cold War; however the 
strategy did not. The logic of extended deterrence and the condition of coupling created by forward 
basing U.S. TNWs in Europe became entrenched in NATO strategic thought.  
Political and Military Utility 
U.S. policymakers support the TNW policy for traditional reasons as well as emerging roles. The fall of the 
Soviet Union by no means assured that Europe was safe from aggression in the early post-Cold War 
years. U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, although reduced in quantity by the Presidential Nuclear 
Initiatives (PNIs), retained their historical political and military utility. In the twenty-first century strategic 
environment, U.S. officials see continued political and military utility in TNWs. The new U.S. defense 
policy goals-assure, dissuade, deter and defeat-outlined in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, combined 
with the Bush administration's doctrine of preemption and focus on counterproliferation laid out in the 
National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, highlight 
security concerns that make administration officials reluctant to give up options.[1] 
 
NATO, as well, supports the continued deployment of TNWs in Europe based on traditional arguments for 
their utility in Alliance security. From 1991 to 1999, the Allies' Strategic Concept emphasized their political 
utility in deterring any kind of war or coercion.[2] Although focused more on the volatile situation in the 
East in the early part of the decade, relations with Russia improved with time and a great deal of effort. 
The Alliance offered reassurances to Russia regarding the status of its TNW arsenal and dual-capable 
aircraft readiness, yet at the same time it emphasized nuclear guarantees, roles and responsibilities to 
new members under the process of enlargement. NATO's nuclear doctrine today places greater 
emphasis on deterring threats posed by WMD proliferation and use. Throughout this period, just as during 
the Cold War, NATO continued to place great value on U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe and 
committed to NATO, which "provide an essential political and military linkage between the European and 
the North American members of the Alliance."[3] For NATO, widespread participation in nuclear sharing 
and nuclear consultative arrangements is a necessity for preserving the transatlantic link. These 
arrangements assure Allies of U.S. commitment and symbolize the credibility of extended deterrence, 
which alleviates the potential for proliferation within the Alliance. In terms of utility, then, NATO's 
European members think mainly politically while U.S. policymakers think both politically and operationally. 
Political and Military Relevance 
Many analysts question the political and military relevance of TNWs in Europe today. The nature of the 
transatlantic link is primarily economic and political, with military links maintained via conventional forces. 
Economic interdependence and dense institutional arrangements couple the United States and Europe in 
ways far beyond the symbolic basing of U.S. theater nuclear weapons. Without these weapons, NATO 
members would continue to participate in nuclear policy decision-making through the political 
mechanisms in the Nuclear Planning Group and the requirement for consensus in NATO decision-
making.  
 
According to NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is 
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States."[4] This 
means that U.S. strategic forces, available for Alliance collective defense under Article V of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, serve to preserve the peace and prevent coercion. In addition to the obligations under 
Article V, the U.S. strategic arsenal is further linked to Europe through conventional force deployments. 
These conventional deployments in Europe not only symbolize U.S. commitment to European security, 
they also enhance the credibility of nuclear deterrence since a nuclear attack on Europe would most 
assuredly affect American forces stationed there. Even if TNWs were withdrawn from Europe, the United 
States would maintain a strategic nuclear response option. Given that the readiness of NATO's dual-
capable aircraft for nuclear missions is now measured in months rather than minutes or hours[5], such an 
option, carried out with strategic bombers or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) would provide 
greater operational flexibility. In this context, a strategic strike, utilizing a low-yield warhead provides the 
same, if not greater utility than a gravity bomb dropped from a tactical aircraft based in Europe. The latter 
becomes irrelevant for European security. 
 
Theater nuclear weapons based in Europe may also be seen as irrelevant from the standpoint of 
credibility and the "nuclear taboo." Efforts to make TNWs more "usable," such as the current feasibility 
studies of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator or "bunker buster," may enhance the capabilities of TNWs, 
but will do little to alleviate the growing taboo against their use. The domestic and international political 
consequences of the decision to use nuclear weapons, especially in a pre-emptive counterproliferation 
role, profoundly affect the decision-maker's willingness to do so. The decision to employ nuclear weapons 
would constitute a violation of the near sixty-year-old "nuclear taboo."  
 
In addition to rejecting international norms and potentially violating international law, the decision to 
employ nuclear weapons preemptively would undermine U.S. global moral leadership. Any U.S. president 
would likely be very hesitant to make such a decision. This applies to a decision to use any nuclear 
weapon—whether theater or strategic, forward deployed or launched from the United States—the nuclear 
taboo relates simply to crossing the nuclear threshold. The reality is that forward deployed TNWs pose no 
more credible threat than low-yield ICBMs or bombers based in the United States in terms of willingness 
to cross the nuclear threshold. This is especially true in Europe where, according to Stanley Sloan, "It is 
also uncertain whether America's European allies would allow the United States to use its Europe-based 
weapons for any purpose other than deterrence or defense of the Alliance."[6] Since these functions are 
provided by conventional forces and the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, TNWs deployed in Europe are 
irrelevant for maintaining security on that continent.  
 
Conventional deterrence, by contrast, may be more effective than deterrence based on theater nuclear 
weapons. Modern conventional forces not only can dominate on the battlefield, they now possess the 
capability to hold hard and difficult targets at risk in deterring the proliferation and use of WMD. According 
to a recent research report published by Air University, "The U.S. is now on the threshold of new 
conventional weapons technology which hold hardened and deeply buried targets at risk, as well as smart 
weapons that loiter over battle lines and target massed hostile forces. These target sets could only be 
previously destroyed using nuclear weapons."[7] As congressional research analyst Jonathan Medalia 
points out, "U.S. forces demonstrated the ability of ground troops to attack tunnel complexes in 
Afghanistan and the ability of precision conventional ordnance to destroy underground bunkers in Iraq. It 
would be better, in this view, to spend funds on improving the ability to destroy these targets with 
conventional means rather than on nuclear weapons."[8] Conventional deterrence enables the United 
States to more credibly threaten what rogue leaders value most—regime survival—and this capability will 
only improve in the future. For these reasons, TNWs based in Europe are irrelevant for European security 
today. 
Counterproductive in Today's Security Environment 
TNWs in Europe are actually counterproductive in today's security environment, particularly because of 
their negative impact on nonproliferation and arms control efforts. NATO simultaneously promotes 
nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation in its security policies. This schizophrenic approach emphasizing 
the value of U.S. TNWs in Europe is counterproductive to European security because it undermines 
NATO's nonproliferation efforts. Theater nuclear weapons in Europe represent a holdover from the Cold 
War situation of immediate deterrence; today they represent a strategy in search of a threat. The problem 
imposed by this situation is precisely that threats will emerge. This is the classic "security dilemma" and 
"spiral model" theory, which still operates today. According to Robert Jervis, "When states seek the ability 
to defend themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because they gain the ability to carry 
out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the 
first state's security."[9] In this regard, emphasizing the utility of these weapons enhances, rather than 
deters, proliferation of WMD because it sends a signal that even the world's greatest power sees TNWs 
as potentially usable and as necessary for security.  
 
NATO's nuclear doctrine is at odds with member states' Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
commitments. The nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO are seen by many as de facto proliferation due 
to the United States' controversial interpretation of Articles I and II—that these restrictions do not apply in 
times of war.[10] According to a British American Security Information Council report, "More than 100 
nations including South Africa, Egypt and the entire Non-Aligned Movement, have consistently expressed 
concern that members of NATO, especially Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, as well 
as the United States, are themselves nuclear proliferators, acting against the intent and possibly the letter 
of the NPT."[11] Continued reliance on the forward-basing policy runs counter to the goals of the 
nonproliferation regime.  
 
This policy also threatens Alliance cohesion due to differing positions on the actual role of forward-based 
U.S. TNWs in NATO counterproliferation policy. One senior European diplomat has strongly staked out 
the European position on the issue: "If you think we are going to let the Americans throw nuclear 
weapons around on Europe's periphery, then you must be crazy."[12] During a recent NATO exercise, 
however, this is precisely the issue that divided the Allied participants.[13] The lack of cohesion actually 
forced NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to end the exercise early "to prevent open conflict 
emerging between allies."[14] 
 
NATO's continued reliance on forward-based TNWs for political power limits the success of confidence 
and security building measures (CSBMs) designed to promote cooperation in nonproliferation because it 
undermines NATO's moral credibility in influencing other states to forego nuclear weapons programs of 
their own. Contrary to NATO doctrine, which assigns political and military utility to U.S. TNWs in Europe, 
these weapons are actually counterproductive for European security. 
 
Both NATO and Russia continue to hold their TNWs in high regard. This emphasis on the utility of these 
weapons creates an immediate deterrence situation where one does not exist, creating a roadblock to 
cooperation on arms control. This situation is particularly problematic as NATO and Russia pursue a 
security relationship based on partnership and cooperation. William Potter and Nikolai Sokov argue that a 
U.S. initiative to remove its residual TNWs in Europe could "go a long way towards dispelling Russian 
fears about NATO and could help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives."[15] Even if 
abandoning the long-standing policy of forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe proves insufficient to induce 
Russia to eliminate all of its theater nuclear weapons, this step could remove an obstacle to further 
cooperation on arms control at relatively little strategic cost, given the nature of the transatlantic link 
today, NATO's conventional superiority, and the general deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.  
 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe also complicate cooperation in nonproliferation. The security of 
Russia's theater nuclear weapons is an issue of great concern in the West. This concern emerges from a 
lack of transparency in the Russian theater nuclear arsenal. Alexander and Millar point out, "The lack of 
information about the size of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal raises uncertainties regarding 
the security of the storage of these weapons as well as about their protections against accidental, 
unauthorized, or illicit use."[16] Russia, however, refuses to "consider negotiations to control its tactical 
nuclear arsenal if the United States will not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe."[17] NATO has 
approached the subject several times with little success. In December 2000, NATO proposed a set of 
transparency measures aimed at conducting reciprocal data exchanges on TNWs. These proposals were 
included in a broad document entitled "Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), 
Verification, Non-proliferation and Arms Control" designed to "enhance mutual trust and promote greater 
openness and transparency on nuclear weapons and safety issues between NATO and Russia."[18] 
Despite such efforts, "information presented by the Russian was extremely vague."[19] The Russian 
refusal to share information on TNWs hinges on the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
Europe. Removing these weapons could, in fact, lead to increased transparency on the Russian TNW 
arsenal, and provide greater opportunities to improve the safety and security of these weapons and keep 
them out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. Recognizing this, some NATO members have 
suggested greater effort on the part of the Alliance. In Lloyd Axworthy's 2000 address to the North Atlantic 
Council, the Canadian official stated, 
Can we not be more transparent about how many nuclear gravity bombs we have left, 
and where they are located? Can NATO not unilaterally reduce the number of remaining 
bombs further, and call for a proportional parallel action by the Russian Federation? 
Could we not take these sorts of measures to increase confidence with others, especially 
Russia, in order to pave the way for greater Russian openness on their huge sub-
strategic stockpiles?[20] 
The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is a reminder of the Cold War mentality. The forward basing policy 
serves as a roadblock to cooperation at a time when the NATO-Russia relationship centers on 
partnership and cooperation. The concession of removing these weapons from Europe could pay 
dividends in terms of cooperation with Russia in the nonproliferation effort.  
Policy Options 
The United States and its European-NATO partners face two policy options regarding TNWs in Europe. 
The first is to maintain the status quo, in which U.S. theater nuclear weapons remain forward-based on 
European soil. The second is withdrawing these weapons from Europe and relying on other means to 




U.S. and Allied risk assessments and interests could lead to a decision to maintain the TNW deployments 
in Europe for the foreseeable future. In this view, threat uncertainties in future Russian political and 
military developments could create a desire among NATO officials to maintain a hedge in nuclear 
capabilities. However, given recent statements by both U.S. and Allied officials regarding the NATO-
Russia security relationship, perhaps an even greater impetus lies in the threat of WMD proliferation and 
use. NATO's increasing role in "out of area" operations and its proximity to volatile areas in the Middle 
East could support a continued reliance on a theater nuclear deterrent. The fact that these weapons are 
closer to potential adversaries than those stationed in the United States could enhance U.S. 
counterproliferation strategy, and future upgrades, as envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review, to an 
existing NATO capability may be politically easier to achieve. Traditional political arguments for Alliance 
cohesion could be maintained, including reassuring Allies of U.S. commitment and credibility and 
ensuring widespread sharing of nuclear roles and responsibilities.  
 
The status quo policy option has potential drawbacks as well. Maintaining these weapons in Europe and 
emphasizing their utility creates an immediate deterrence situation where one does not exist. If the 
greatest military power, and by extension, the strongest alliance in the world, claim TNWs are required for 
security, then smaller, less powerful states in much more precarious security situations will surely follow 
suit. These weapons enhance, rather than deter, proliferation of WMD. NATO's nuclear sharing 
arrangements are seen as incompatible with the letter and intent of the NPT, and maintaining these 
arrangements could undermine the Alliance's position in supporting nonproliferation. Moreover, stressing 
TNW utility reduces the psychological effectiveness of CSBMs designed to reassure non-nuclear weapon 
states and increases incentives for these states to acquire WMD. NATO's adherence to TNW utility 
complicates relations with Russia as well, and could continue to hinder prospects for cooperation on arms 
control and nonproliferation. This is particularly troublesome when the security and stability of Russia's 




The United States and its Allies could, on the other hand, choose to withdraw the U.S. TNWs from 
Europe, relying instead on other means to provide security for Europe. Such a policy would recognize the 
growing irrelevance of these weapons, given their decreasing credibility, the increasing importance of the 
nuclear taboo, and the capabilities inherent in modern U.S. and Allied conventional combat power. 
Conventional forces today can dominate on the battlefield and also increasingly possess some capability 
to destroy hardened and difficult targets. New conventional initiatives will enhance these capabilities in 
the future. From the standpoint of rationality, retaliation and unbearable damage, conventional deterrence 
via modern forces may be more effective for threatening regime survival—a key factor in deterring, 
dissuading and defeating potential rogue states and WMD proliferators. Removing U.S. TNWs from 
Europe would be an important disarmament step that could signal a change in real intent and real 
capability away from reliance on nuclear weapons for security. This would enhance the effectiveness of 
CSBMs and provide greater reassurance for both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. By 
making NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements irrelevant, withdrawal would increase the credibility of 
Allies' commitments to the NPT and enhance international efforts to stop the proliferation of WMD. 
Moreover, removing the residual U.S. nuclear presence in Europe would eliminate a significant roadblock 
to cooperation in NATO-Russia relations, which could lead to a reduction in Russian theater nuclear 
forces or at least increased transparency on the size and security of the Russian arsenal.  
 
Withdrawing the TNWs from Europe could be seen as a reduction in U.S. capability and removal of an 
option for the president in a crisis situation. In reality, this is unlikely to be the case. Given that the 
readiness of NATO's dual-capable aircraft for nuclear missions is now measured in months rather than 
minutes or hours, response time is now shorter for a strategic strike launched from the United States than 
it is for a tactical strike launched from NATO territory, should the worst possible scenario actually arise. 
Arguments regarding the time factor apply primarily to the potential for preemptive strikes; however, it is 
highly unlikely that NATO would allow the preemptive use of nuclear weapons based in Alliance territory. 
Such a decision could, in fact, greatly impact Alliance cohesion. 
 
The strongest criticism against removing U.S. TNWs from Europe revolves around the very issue of 
Alliance cohesion. NATO's conception of the transatlantic link and the essential political and military role 
of TNWs in maintaining a condition of coupling between the United States and Europe have become 
institutionalized to the point of bureaucratic opposition. Yet the transatlantic link now reaches far beyond 
the symbolic basing of a few hundred nuclear gravity bombs on European soil. Deep economic 
interdependence and dense institutional integration, combined with U.S. conventional commitments and 
the ultimate security guarantee of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence in the background characterize the 
nature of the transatlantic link today. As former Supreme Allied Command Europe, Wesley Clark, properly 
asserts, "evolution and adaptation of the comfortable security fixtures of the past should be no cause for 
concern, for through such prudent adjustments we equip ourselves to confront the flux of events that time 
shall surely bring."[21] The time in which U.S. TNWs played a pivotal role in European security is long 
past; these weapons are now in some ways irrelevant and counterproductive in others. NATO should 
withdraw the U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, and focus instead on a strategy of conventional 
deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, 
email ccc@nps edu with subject line "Subscribe" There is no charge and your address will be used
for no other purpose. 
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